

Correlated equilibriums of the games in fuzzy environment

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In this paper, we introduce the notion of fuzzy correlated equilibrium in bimatrix games, where the payoffs of the players are given by fuzzy numbers. The correlated equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium, i.e. every Nash equilibrium is correlated equilibrium, this basic relationship is satisfied even between the fuzzy Nash and fuzzy correlated equilibriums, if the ranking method is an incomplete preference preorder. We compared the notions of degree of being Nash equilibrium [2] and (α, β) -correlated equilibrium [3] with the notion of correlated equilibrium.

References

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